Online Appendix

A   Supporting Information

A.1   Decentralization & Local Government Competencies

	Ratio: Local-Central Social Exp. (1)	Ratio: Local-Central Taxation (2)	*Social Assistance (3)*			*Other Social Services*	
			Eligibility	Benefit Rate	Supp.	Housing (4)	Childcare (5)
Italy	0.17	0.29	Y	Y		(Y)	(Y)
Norway	0.27	0.18	Y	Y		(Y)	Y
France	0.38	0.32				(Y)	Y
Switzerland	0.41	0.41	Y	Y			(Y)
Spain	0.44	0.21			Y		(Y)
Belgium	0.51	0.10	Y		Y	(Y)	(Y)
Netherlands	0.51	0.06	Y		Y	(Y)	(Y)
Sweden	0.52	0.52	Y	Y		Y	Y
Denmark	1.40	0.33	Y		Y	Y	Y

(Y) = Competency shared with the regional level

(1) OECD COFOG Database, 2008. Excludes pension expenditure.

(2) Eurostat Government Finance Statistics, 2008.

(3) Frazer, H. and Marlier, E., 2009. "Minimum Income Schemes across EU Member States". European Commission, Brussels; Kazepov et al. 2010. "Rescaling Social Policies: Towards Multilevel Governance in Europe." Farnham: Ashgate.

Eligibility: coded as 'Y' if the decision to provide benefits is made on a case-by-case basis by local government officials working within framework laws. This excludes cases in which eligibility is determined by local representatives of a national bureaucratic agency. Benefit rate: coded as 'Y' if local governments have the ability to modify the monthly benefit payout for the main social assistance program. Supplementary: coded as 'Y' if local governments are permitted to supplement the main social assistance program with additional discretionary cash transfers, for instance: Long-term Extra Allowance/Special Social Assistance in NLD, Financial Aid in BE, Housing Supplement in DK. In ESP, local discretionary programs vary across the regions. France does not have a formal supplementary program, but may deliver discretionary social assistance through local social action centers (CCAS).

(4) Pittini, A. and Laino, E. "Housing Europe Review." 2012. CECODHAS.

Coded as 'Y' if municipal governments exercise control over social housing eligibility and rates, and if the public share of total housing stock exceeds 5%.

(5) Council of Europe Family Policy Database; Plantenga, J. and Remery, C., 2015. Provision of childcare services: A comparative review of EU member states. CESifo DICE Report.

Coded as 'Y' if municipal governments determine eligibility/funding for public childcare. Excludes cases where $>= 1/3$ of children over 3 receive no formal care.

A.2 Cross-National Municipal Dataset

[See Figure 1, Table 1]

Sources: All datasets were collected by the author, drawing from national and local statistical sources, custom requests, and data purchases.

Dependent Variable: Table 1: Per capita social expenditure, following national accounting standards. Figure 1: Social expenditure divided by total expenditure. Figures exclude capital expenditures. Expenditures are net for countries that record line-item income for social accounts (DK, NLD, NOR, SWE, SUI). For the remaining countries, figures indicate gross social expenditures. Results are robust to using gross social expenditures for all countries. Compared to other accounting systems, French social expenditure is highly aggregated, and includes discretionary payments made to local organizations and cultural initiatives. Social expenditures were reconstructed from subaccounts in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway to exclude health and education items and improve comparability with other national accounting systems. Expenditure in the Netherlands excludes mandatory payments from the national social assistance benefit

Years Covered: Temporal coverage reflects data availability for the dependent variable and covariates, with two exceptions. For Belgium, years in which voting rights for non-EU nationals were inactive (prior to 2004) have been excluded. For Denmark, only years prior to the municipal consolidation reforms have been included.

Municipalities Covered: The final sample for each country reflects listwise deletion. When municipalities have merged (as in the Netherlands), all municipalities involved in the merger were excluded from the panel. Given that local financial data in Switzerland are available only on a canton-by-canton basis, the Swiss sample is limited to the following cantons for which data could be obtained: Aargau, Bern, Basel-Landschaft, Luzern, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, St. Gallen, and Zürich. Listwise deletion was most common in France, where income data is unavailable for municipalities with less than 3,500 inhabitants.

Covariate Coverage: Covariates differ slightly across countries, depending on the availability of municipal-level data. The following table identifies the specific covariates used:

	BE	DK	NLD	NOR	SWE	FRA	ITA	ESP	SUI
Social Dem. Voteshare	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y
Local Unemp. Rate	Y	Y	-	Y	-	Y	Y	-	-
Local Inactivity Rate	-	-	Y	-	Y	-	-	Y	Y
% in Bottom Income Decile	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	-	Y
% Paying Income Tax	Y	-	-	-	-	-	Y	-	-
Mean Income Tax Payment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	-

Left-wing parties: Municipalities were classified according to whether left-wing voteshare was higher than the national median at the beginning of the panel period. This designation refers to major parties identified as social democratic, socialist, or communist. Green parties are excluded. The following parties are included within the classification. Belgium: SP/PS. Denmark: A, F. Netherlands: SP, PvdA. Norway: Labour Party, Socialist Left Party, Communist Party, Red Electoral Alliance. Sweden: SAP, V.

France: left-wing coalitions, as defined by the Ministry of the Interior. Italy: left-wing coalitions, as defined by the Ministry of the Interior. Spain: PSOE, ERC, EB, PSC, IU. In Switzerland, local council vote shares are unavailable for most municipalities within the German-speaking regions. As a result, vote shares for SP, PDA, and SOL within national elections are used as a proxy.

B   Additional Results

B.1   Relationship Between Foreign Resident Share and Local Social Spending

Supporting information for Figure 1. Reports coefficients from models regressing the share of foreign residents within a municipality on social spending as a share of the budget (first row), and logged per capita social expenditure (second row). Both specifications include controls for population size (logged), local poverty, and revenues per head. All data are from 2008, with the exception of Denmark, which is measured in 2005 due to municipal mergers that occurred from 2006-2008.

Table B1: Cross-Sectional Relationships, with Controls

| | Local Voting Rights | | | | | No Local Voting Rights | | | |
	BE	DK	NLD	NOR	SWE	FRA	ITA	ESP	SUI
% Budget	0.12	0.67	0.87	0.37	0.49	-0.10	-0.09	-0.17	-0.37
	(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Logged Per Capita Exp.	3.10	4.78	6.27	2.68	3.37	-0.95	-1.31	-1.28	-0.94
	(0.54)	(1.45)	(1.37)	(0.72)	(1.00)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.22)	(0.32)

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients indicate the marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in foreign resident population on percentage social expenditure, as a portion of the budget (top row) or per capita (bottom).

B.2 Alternative Specifications for Cross-National Panels

Table B2: Table 1, with Spatial Control

To control for regional determinants of spending levels, this specification includes a covariate that measures, for each municipality and year, the average per capita welfare expenditure in all directly neighboring municipalities.

| | Local Voting Rights | | | | | No Local Voting Rights | | | |
	BE	DK	NLD	NOR	SWE	FRA	ITA	ESP	SUI
All municipalities	1.58	2.47	3.21	1.18	3.19	-1.28	-0.74	-0.32	-0.23
	(0.90)	(1.19)	(1.69)	(0.60)	(1.12)	(0.59)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.34)
Left-wing > Median	1.62	3.82	5.30	1.32	4.53	-0.29	-1.08	-0.64	-1.00
	(1.12)	(1.10)	(2.02)	(0.72)	(1.22)	(0.68)	(0.53)	(0.29)	(0.49)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

Table B3: Table 1, with Revenue Control

Changes in municipal revenues may be endogenous to political decisions at the municipal level. Nevertheless, to control for reforms implemented by national governments that may have affected municipalities differentially, the following specification includes logged per capita total revenue within the specification.

| | Local Voting Rights | | | | | No Local Voting Rights | | | |
	BE	DK	NLD	NOR	SWE	FRA	ITA	ESP	SUI
All municipalities	1.46	2.74	2.86	1.18	3.15	-1.27	-1.03	-0.41	-0.84
	(0.90)	(1.21)	(1.71)	(0.62)	(1.10)	(0.61)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.47)
Left-wing > Median	1.36	4.26	5.44	1.17	4.59	-0.62	-1.18	-0.74	-1.93
	(1.07)	(1.12)	(2.02)	(0.78)	(1.19)	(0.67)	(0.49)	(0.26)	(0.65)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

B.3 Marginal Effect on Per Capita Spending Following the Reform

Table 2 estimates the total impact of the reform in terms of the expected percent change in social spending for a municipality at the mean level of foreign settlement. Given that baseline rates of social expenditure vary, the following table provides marginal effects for an alternate specification with an unlogged dependent variable. For instance, Model A suggests a municipality in Switzerland with 10% foreign population would increase its per capita social expenditure by 15.80 CHF per capita following the reform; the corresponding figure for Belgium is 19.30 EUR per capita. Note that the exchange rate between CHF and EUR on January 1, 2005 was 1 : 0.65

Table B4

	Switzerland (CHF per cap.)				Belgium (EUR per cap.)			
	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
Post-Reform	1.58	3.25	1.62	0.87	1.93	1.07	1.87	1.69
	(0.53)	(0.79)	(0.54)	(0.52)	(0.47)	(0.73)	(0.51)	(0.53)
Covariates	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	-	✓
Population Trim	-	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-
Regional Time Trends	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	✓

Placebo	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4
	0.22	0.51	1.34	0.77	0.40	0.57	-0.37	-0.33
	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.43)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.40)	(0.36)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

B.4 Relaxing the Linearity Assumption

The specification in the main text assumes a linear relationship between the level of foreign settlement in the effect size. To relax this assumption, we can fit a general additive model and flexibly model the interaction between the foreign resident population and the observed increase in expenditure (Figure B1). Table B5 takes an alternate approach, and divides the data into j equally spaced bins.

The results from each approach suggest that estimates obtained from the main specification are arguably conservative. However, while the relationship is monotonic in Belgium, the relationship becomes saturated at high levels of foreign settlement in Switzerland. Although Swiss municipalities with high levels of foreign settlement ($> 30\%$) exhibited elevated expenditures in the post-reform period, the effect is less pronounced than for municipalities in the center of the distribution. This suggests that different patterns may obtain when the number of non-citizens approaches majority status.

Figure B1: Effect of Voting Rights Extension

Specification follows Equation 2 in text; the interaction is modeled as a smooth function using a generalized additive model (GAM).

Table B5: Binned Specifications for Switzerland and Belgium

To avoid imposing a specific functional form, the municipalities are divided into equally spaced bins, according to the stock of foreign residents in the reform year. Next, the bins are substituted for the linear interaction in the fixed effects model presented in the main text. The estimates presented below indicate the expected marginal increase in social expenditure observed in each bin, relative to the lowest bin, following the reform.

Terciles	2	3	
Switzerland % Δ	4.61	7.71	
	(2.39)	(2.55)	
Belgium % Δ	4.54	7.64	
	(3.67)	(4.18)	

Quartiles	2	3	4
Switzerland % Δ	4.21	4.76	7.81
	(2.48)	(2.71)	(2.97)
Belgium % Δ	-1.83	2.06	5.79
	(4.51)	(3.59)	(3.43)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

Figure B2: Differenced Local Linear Fit

Local linear estimator, with 95% confidence intervals. The vertical axis plots the change in municipal spending observed from t-2 to t+2, where *t* represents the first full year after the reform took effect. To permit comparisons across cases, spending is indexed to 100 at the start of the period.

B.5 Assessing Unemployment Shocks as a Potential Confounder

Local unemployment rates are included in every specification. However, given that employment directly influences levels of local social spending, this remains the strongest potential confounder. The following tests evaluate this possibility.

First, no significant deviations in unemployment are visible across municipalities following the reform, suggesting that the increase in spending was not driven by asymmetric unemployment shocks.

Figure B3

It is also possible that increased spending follows previous shocks to the unemployment and local poverty rate. To evaluate this, the table below re-estimates the main model, adding in lagged terms for both poverty and the local unemployment rate.

Table B6: Lagged Unemployment and Poverty

	Switzerland			Belgium		
	A	C	D	A	C	D
Effect at Mean	5.75	7.01	6.67	1.70	1.20	1.11
	(1.42)	(1.84)	(1.32)	(0.51)	(0.88)	(0.52)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Low Pop Excluded	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Regional Time Trends	-	-	✓	-	-	✓

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

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B.6 Difference in Spending Across Administrations

The main specification for Belgium and Switzerland uses yearly expenditure data. As a result, the specification is able to detect increases in spending that occurred in the first fiscal year following the reform. However, another potential quantity of interest is the difference in aggregate social spending between administrations that were elected prior to and after the implementation of the reform, respectively. In Belgium, the terms began in 2001 and 2007, while in Switzerland it varied by canton: 2004-2008 in Geneva, and 2002-2007 in Fribourg and Vaud. Voting rights were implemented in 2004 (Belgium), 2004 (Vaud), 2005 (Fribourg), and 2006 (Geneva). Note that in Vaud, a major social assistance reform was implemented on January 1, 2006 (t+2), prior to the beginning of the subsequent term. As a result, the subsequent analysis omits Vaud from the sample.

Given that incumbents significantly raised spending prior to the reform, a simple comparison of terms would be biased due to heterogeneity in voting rights within the first term. However, to obtain a comparison of administrations while holding political cycles constant, we can implement a specification that compares the first 2 years of spending in the first term (prior to voting reform) to the first 2 years of spending in the subsequent term (after voting rights extension). Formally, the specification is:

$$\Delta Y_i = \theta + \beta_0 F_{1:3} + \beta_1 \Delta X_i + \epsilon_j$$

where ΔY_i represents the change in net social spending per capita between the first two years of each term, F represents the share of foreign residents in each municipality at the time of the election, and X indicates a set of economic covariates, including local unemployment rates and income levels, that are averaged and differenced for each period. In Switzerland, the specifications also includes a cantonal fixed effect. Given that the relationship between foreign voting share and spending outcomes may be nonlinear, F is binned into equally sized terciles. In Switzerland, marginal increases are visible in the upper tercile, while in Belgium increases are visible in the top two terciles of foreign settlement. The bottom row of the table displays the estimated marginal effect for a 1% change in the level of foreign settlement, using an alternative linear specification.

Table B7: Change in Per Capita Social Spending Across Pre- and Post- Reform Terms

	Switzerland	Belgium
Bottom Tercile	13.78	7.57
	(2.76)	(5.44)
Middle Tercile	11.17	18.11
	(3.58)	(4.81)
Upper Tercile	22.15	18.13
	(4.68)	(4.43)
Marginal Effect	0.60	1.22
	(0.15)	(0.55)

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Swiss estimates exclude Vaud.

B.7 Additional Robustness Checks for Belgium

Although Belgian municipalities provide a range of discretionary services and transfers, the main cash transfer program – the RIS – is delivered by local governments, but strictly regulated by the federal government. Given this mandate, the results would not be robust if the rate deviated sharply from historic trends in the year of foreign voter enfrachisement, and/or b) changes in RIS caseloads before the reform disproportionately affected municipalities with high shares of non-EU residents. The two following tests demonstrate that this was not the case.

The monthly benefit rate for RIS grew steadily across the period of observation, with no sharp deviations occurring in either the year of the legal reform (2004), or the following year. [1]

Date	Revised Rate
Sep-00	539.44
Jun-01	550.22
Jan-02	572.22
Feb-02	583.66
Jun-03	595.32
Oct-04	613.33
Aug-05	625.60
Oct-06	644.48
Apr-07	657.37
Jan-08	683.95

Moreover, municipalities with high proportions of non-EU residents did not observe sharp increases in RIS beneficaries in the year prior to the reform.

Figure B4: RIS

In tandem, these results suggest that changes to national-level social policy did not motivate the increased expenditures observed in Belgium following the introduction of local foreign voting rights.

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[1] les circulaires du SPP Intégration sociale

B.8   Additional Robustness Checks for Switzerland

Figure B5: Generalized Additive Model (GAM) - Individual Swiss Cantons

Although the Swiss design leverages the gradual roll-out across cantons, we should still expect to observe effects in individual cantons. The GAM models below (fit on the full time series with covariates) can be viewed similarly to the specification used for Belgium, in which the legal change occurs simultaneously across all observations. Note that each canton has relatively few municipalities, reducing statistical power. Nevertheless, they suggest an approximately similar response across cantons. The non-monotonic result for Vaud is driven by municipalities with high rates of social expenditure prior to the reform (and consequently limited budget flexibility).


Figure B6: Local Linear Fit - Individual Swiss Cantons

As a robustness check, the simplified specification in this figure plots the change in spending between t-2 and t+2 as a function of the foreign resident population, using a local linear fit. Given that secular rates of social expenditure growth differ across cantons, the vertical axis measures the demeaned change, in CHF, in net expenditures per capita.


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Table B8: Omitting cantons from panel models

The following table demonstrates that the Swiss results are robust to dropping any individual canton. The upper half of the table presents the results of a linear specification (Table 2) and binned tercile specification (Table B5). The lower half of the table displays similar results when using an unlogged dependent variable.

	Removing Fribourg	Removing Geneva	Removing Vaud
Effect at Mean (%)	7.09	7.34	14.24
	(5.24)	(1.75)	(5.69)
Mar. Effect 2nd Tercile (%)	4.82	4.10	0.47
	(3.33)	(2.14)	(3.44)
Mar. Effect 3rd Tercile (%)	12.26	7.10	14.75
	(3.69)	(2.66)	(3.94)
Effect at Mean (CHF per capita)	34.76	32.31	38.47
	(13.36)	(7.21)	(8.91)
Mar. Effect 2nd Tercile (CHF per cap)	41.80	31.87	16.72
	(15.10)	(10.28)	(9.09)
Mar. Effect 3rd Tercile (CHF per cap)	100.20	86.66	45.70
	(20.15)	(15.82)	(13.12)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

B.9 Fiscal Consequences: Cross-National

As outlined in the text, local governments that adopt a strategy of recruiting immigrant voters have incentives to raise additional local revenues. Although heterogeneity in tax instruments across states prohibits a straightforward comparison of local tax rates, the following table assesses the effects of an immigrant influx on per capita 'own revenues' (taxes, fees, and self-financing). The fixed effect specification follows equation #1 in the main text, substituting the original dependent variable with the logarithm of municipal own revenues per capita. All regressions include the municipal-level controls described in the main text. Coefficients indicate the percentage increase in own revenues expected following a 1% increase in the foreign resident population.

The argument advanced in the text suggests that municipalities will raise additional revenues in response to an influx of foreign residents. This tendency is visible within several states with voting rights, particularly those with elevated support for left-wing parties. Note that unlike the other states within the foreign voting rights group, the Netherlands has no income taxation at the local level. Although the text does not offer a theoretical prediction for states lacking foreign voting rights, the prevailing pattern is negative: that is, per capita revenues tend to decline.

Table B9: Effect of 1% Increase in Foreign Population Share on Downstream Per Capita Own Revenues

| | Local Voting Rights | | | | | No Local Voting Rights | | | |
	BE	DK	NLD	NOR	SWE	FRA	ITA	ESP	SUI
All municipalities	1.29	1.50	0.58	1.27	1.72	-0.06	-1.84	-0.15	0.93
	(0.68)	(1.36)	(0.56)	(0.28)	(1.05)	(0.37)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.51)
Left-wing > Median	2.89	0.09	1.17	1.32	2.53	-0.27	-2.57	-0.08	0.77
	(0.81)	(2.03)	(0.65)	(0.38)	(1.40)	(0.53)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.66)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

B.10 Fiscal Consequences: Switzerland and Belgium

Table B10: Municipal Debt

This table reports coefficients for specification #2 in the main text, substituting the original dependent variable with the logarithm of municipal debt. The results suggest that municipalities in Switzerland and Belgium increased municipal debt following the reform.

	Switzerland			Belgium		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
All municipalities	2.63	2.12	2.54	2.46	2.91	2.37
	(1.07)	(1.05)	(1.04)	(0.62)	(0.87)	(0.60)
Covariates	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	-
Population Trim	-	✓	-	-	✓	-

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Coefficients indicate the effect at the mean level of foreign settlement.

Figure B7: Own Revenues

This figure the relationship between the change in local own revenues versus the percentage of non-citizens within each municipality, separately for the 3 years following and 3 years preceeding the reform. The latter is a placebo estimate – no significant relationship between foreign settlement and changes in local revenue are visible prior to the reform (dashed lines). In contrast, after the reform, municipalities with higher shares of foreign populations raised additional local revenues.

Table B11: Implications for other Municipal Spending

This table assesses changes to other local spending line items following the reform in Switzerland, using a similar specification as equation 2 in the main text. Comparable standardized data was unavailable for Belgium. To permit clear comparisons across spending areas with different baseline levels of spending, the dependent variable is not logged. As a result coefficients represent the observed change in per capita expenditures (in CHF), for municipalities at the mean level of foreign settlement following the reform. Budget classifications in Vaud differ slightly from other cantons; subaccounts in Vaud were accordingly reclassified to permit comparisons with Geneva and Fribourg. The specification also includes quadratic time trends for each canton. Estimates suggest an increase in education and social spending, and a decrease in administrative and cultural spending following the reform .

	Δ CHF Per Capita
Social Spending	29.23
	(6.39)
Administration	-30.59
	(9.52)
Public Safety	-3.71
	(5.82)
Education	14.19
	(6.75)
Culture	-5.10
	(2.30)
Transport	-0.28
	(11.92)
Environment	9.73
	(16.16)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

B.11 Alternate Measure of Local Partisanship: Switzerland and Belgium

Table B12: Effect of Voting Rights Extension on Local Social Expenditure, Left-Wing Municipalities

Follows Model A of Table 2 in the main text, splitting the sample according to the support for left-wing parties in the municipality in the year prior to the reform. The results are consistent with Figure 3, and suggest that the effect is driven by comparatively left-wing municipalities.

| | Switzerland | | Belgium | |
	< Median	> Median	< Median	> Median
Effect at Mean	6.68	8.62	1.29	1.91
	(2.46)	(2.57)	(0.87)	(0.51)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population Trim	-	✓	-	✓

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality.

B.12   Relationship Between Change in Social Spending and Foreign Voter Registration

Figure B8

Evaluates the relationship between the change in aggregate social spending and foreign voter registration, for municipalities with above the median foreign settlement in Switzerland and Belgium. Local linear fit, 95% confidence intervals.

Belgium

Foreign Registration Rate (%)

% Change in Per Head Spending, 2005 – 2003

Switzerland

Foreign Registration Rate (%)

% Change in Per Head Spending, 2 years after Reform

B.13 Flexible Analysis of Partisanship: Cross-National

The specification in Table 1 of the main text uses a dichotomous indicator for partisanship to avoid making functional form assumptions concerning the relationship between left-wing vote share and local redistributive responses to immigration. To flexibly describe this interaction, the following GAM specification is fit:

$$\Delta Y_{t-t2,i} = s(L_i, \Delta F_{t-t2,i})$$

where Y represents logged social expenditures per capita (demeaned), L represents the local voteshare for left-wing parties at the beginning of the period, and F represents the foreign resident share. t is set to 2008, and $t2$ is set to 2004, except for Denmark (2005-2001), and the Netherlands (2009-2005) due to data limitations. The estimated interaction between the change in foreign resident share and partisanship appears in the heat map plots below. Blue indicates a decrease in social expenditures relative to the mean, while orange indicates an increase. Although the nature of the interaction varies across countries, a different dynamic is visible within each group of states. In states without foreign voting rights, the largest relative decrease in spending is observed in municipalities that experience high immigrant growth rates and have low left-wing support (bottom right-hand corner), while the largest increase is observed in left-wing municipalities with low growth rates (upper left-hand corner). A different relationship is observed for states with foreign voting rights.